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REMEDIS FOR BRIACH OF WABRAI-TY IN MISSOURI
REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY IN
MISSOURL
While the courts of the various States are more or less
generally agreed upon the substantive law underlying the
subject of warranties, they still remain at loggerheads upon
the question of what remedies the vendee may pursue when
the vendor's warranty is not complied with. The chief con-
troversy is upon the subject of recission for a breach of war-
ranty, some courts holding that the buyer may rescind and
others ruling that his only remedy is an action for damages
for the breach. Moreover, in this connection, some tribunals
distinguish between a sale of chattels generally and a sale
of specific goods, while still others allow the purchaser to re-
ject the goods when tendered, but deny him the right to rescind
after he has once received the goods. Another point of con-
tention is whether the vendee's right of recovery survives the
acceptance of the goods after an opportunity for inspection;
and with reference to this question, some cases draw distinc-
tions between express and implied warranties and between
present and executory sales. It will therefore be the purpose
of this note to examine the law of our own State upon the sub-
ject and to give a brief digest of the decisions of the Missouri
courts.
It has been continually and consistently held by the Appel-
late Courts of Missouri that when there is a breach of war-
ranty the vendee Inay return the property and rescind
the contract within a reasonable time, or he may retain it,
and, when sued for the purchase money, plead a total or par-
tial failure of consideration. In the leading case of Branson
v. Turner,' upon the authority of which many of the later
cases are decided, the Court said:
"If the cattle on trial and further investigation proved
to be otherwise than as warranted, the vendee had two reme-
1. 77 Mo. 489.
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iies. He could have returned the property to the vendor,
provided he acted seasonably, and rescinded the contract; or
he could have retained the same and when sued for the pur-
chase money pleaded a total or partial failure of consider-
ation."12
It should be noted, however, that worthlessness of the chat-
tel for the desired purpose does not constitute a total failure
of consideration, only worthlessness for any purpose whatso.
ever amounting to a total failure. The amount which the ven-
dee is permitted to recoup is the difference between the con-
tract price and the value of the chattel for any purpose in its
actual condition.$
In this last case it is said at page 568 that "While in an
action upon a promissory note given for the purchase price of
a chattel bought for a particular purpose, whether upon an
express or imp'ied warranty, with or without fraud, it is not
necessary that the purchaser should return the article or offer
to return it, or to rescind the contract, or that such article
should be wholly worthless, in order that he may avail him-
self of his plea of a failure of consideration. Yet, if he re-
tains the article and does not offer to return it, and such
article is not wholly worthless, such plea can avail him only
so far as to defeat a recovery on the note to the extent of the
difference between the value of the article, had it been such
as it was represented to be, and its value such as it is shown
really to be."
Likewise, if the purchase price has already been paid, the
2. The following cases, declare the law as above stated: Werner v.
O'Brlen, 40 Mo. App. 483; Tower v. Pauly, 51 Mo. App. 75; Kerr v. Emerson,
64 Mo. App. 159; Tall v. Chapman, 66 Mo. App. 581; Little Rock Grain Co. v.
Brubaker, 89 Mo. App. 1; Phares Y. Jaynes, 118 Mo. App. 546; Laumeler v.
Dolph. 145 Mo. App. 78; Monarch Metal Weatherstrip Co. v. Hanlck, 172 Mo.
App. 680; Excelsior Stove Mfg. Co. v. Million, 174 Mo. App. 718; El Paso Mil-
ling Co. v. Davis, 194 Mo. App. L
3. Thummell v. Dukes. 52 Mo. App. 53; Small v. Bartlett, 96 Mo. App.
550; Crenshaw v. Locker, 186 Mo. 375. following the leading case of Brown
v. Weldon, 99 Mo. 564.
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purchaser may sue for damages for the breach or recover the
purchase price if he has rescinded the contract'
In Laumeler v. Dolph, supra, the Court says, at page 84:
"The law is that if a purchaser is persuaded by the seller
to keep the chattel for a while to give it a proper trial, and
he does so, and it nevertheless does not come up to the war-
ranties, he may still return the same and recover the amount
paid on account of the purchase price."
Where there is no rescission, and the vendee merely seekR
to recover damages for the breach, the law is that a warranty
survives the acceptance of the goods and the vendee may
retain the goods, rely on the warranty and recover the dif-
ference between the value of the goods actually delivered and
those contracted for at the time of the sale. The case of
Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Baskett,5 contains the following
excellent statement of the law on this point by Judge Goode
at page 62:
"Acceptance and retention of an article sold with a war-
ranty do not prevent the buyer from recovering any damage
he may sustain on account of the article falling short of the
warranty, at least if he makes timely objection. And the
damage may be recovered either by an abatement from the
agreed price when the buyer is sued or by an action if he has
already paid in full. In the language of the books, the war-
ranty survives the acceptance, and this rule is reasonable;
for the purpose of a warranty is to make the purchaser whole
if the article sold turns out after delivery to be of inferior
merit."
In reference to extension of payment as a waiver of the
breach, the learned Judge further states at page 66:
"But the cases, with few exceptions, hold that failure of
4. Johnson v. Whitman, 20 Mo. App. 100; Laumeler y. Dolph, 145 Mo.
App. 78.
5. 98 Mo. App. 5L
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consideration or breach of warranty may be maintained not-
withstanding there was an extension of payment by renewal
or otherwise, unless an intention to waive the failure or breach
is proven."
In the Atkins Brothers Co. v. Southern Grain Co.," the
Court says at page 125:
"Stated in a different way, the instruction is grounded
upon a view of the law that in executory contracts for the
sale of personal property, a warranty, as a matter of law,
does not survive an inspection or an opportunity to inspect
by the buyer. There are authorities supporting that view,
but we believe the weight of authority and the better reason
is with the opposing statement, viz., the buyer does not
rely on his warranty when sued for the contract price.'"
The law, as contained in the supporting cases, (see foot
note) applies as to implied warranties only where the vendee
accepts wthout knowledge of any defect in the property. When
the vendee buys without an express warranty, or fraud, on
the part of the seller, then his subsequent acceptance of the
thing sold with a full knowledge of its defects, precludes
him, in the absence of any previous objection or tender of a
rescission, from recovering damages for defects in the article
retained. Huber Mfg. Co. v. Hunter."
But in order to rescind the contract for breach of warranty
and defend when sued for the price, or recover it if paid, the
vendee must within a reasonable time return or tender back
the chattel in toto so as to place the vendor in statu quo; when
the vendee disables himself from so doing, he cannot rescind,
6. 119 Mo. App. 119.
7. Cases to the same effect: Long Brothers v. The J. K. Armsby Co.,
43 Mo. App. 253; Compton v. Parsons. 76 Mo. 455; Vos v. McGuire, 18 Mo.
App. 477; Martin v. Maxwell, 18 Mo. App. 176; Ross v. Barker, 30 Mo.
385; Osborne v. Henry. 70 Mo. App. 19; Triplett v. Montgomery, 81 Mo.
App: 141; June v. Falkenburg, 89 Mo. App. 563; Alabama Steel & Wire Co.,
110 Mo. App. 41; Noble v. Nelson, 154 Mo. App. 616; (Good statement;
Page 618).
8. 87 Mo. App. 50.
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unles the goods were of no value for any purpose whatsoever.
In the ladin case of Tower v. Pauly,' the defendant in the
Autumn of 1889, pursuant to agreement, built in plaintiff *s
bae a furnace which was warranted to heat to a oertain
temperature when the thermometer registered a specified tem-
perature outside. The plaintiff did not move into the house
until the Fall of 1890 and after using the furnace during the
Winter of 1890-91, during which time it did not perform as
warrantod, he tendered it back in the Spring of 1891, seeking
to reseWt and recover the purchase price. The court decided
in favor of the defendant, declaring the elapsed time unreas-
onable as a matter of law, and stating further that the plain-
tiff could not rescind since he had taken twenty-two hundred
bricks which surrounded the furnace and used them iu the
installation of another heating plant, thus disabling himself
from returning the property in toto.
In McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Brady,10 it is said
at pag 294:
"It may be that the machine was not as warranted, was
indeed worthless as a combined reaper and binder, the use
contemplated in its purchase, and yet it may have been of
some value as a reaper or for other purposes. Before the pur-
chaser can be allowed to defeat the entire claim for the
purchase price, he must not only allege and prove that the
machine did not answer the demands of the warranty, but he
must also show either that he returned or offered to return
the machine, or that it was entirely worthless for any purpose
whatever. The purpose of the law is to make the purchaser
whole, nothing more.""1
. $1, Mo. App. 75.
10. ,7 Mo. App. 29L
I.. Came. supportlng nile of recislon: Walls r. Ottes. 4 Mo. App. 1:
Etrly Y. Campbell, 44 Mo. App. Rl; Heinman Y. Hatcher, 106 Mo. App.
433: ?bar; '. Jaynes. 11S Mo. App. 54; Monarch Westbarstrip Co. v.
Hanki IT Mo. App. 6S0; 8iRnamoa t. Moore. 16i Mo. App. 16; ruron
Inp. CO. . Panmer. 121 Mo. App. 30; Mrth v. Wiskerchen 19 Mo.
App. 515, I.o. 533; Brown v. WeldoM guprL
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What is a reasonable time within which to return or tender
back the chattel is ordinarily a question of fact for the de-
termination of the jury, but when the elapsed time is so short
or so long that ordinary men could not differ as to its reason-
ableness, it may be held either sufficient or insufficient by the
court as a matter of law as in Tower v. Pauly, supra.
In Viertel v. Smith, 2 it is said that:
"The rule of law is well understood that, while the vendee
of a chattel may on the breach of the warranty thereof rescind
the contract and recover back the purchase price, yet the ven-
dee must act with reasonable expedition; must within a reas-
onable time test the article, offer to restore the property and
demand back his money.
"As to what is a reasonable time is generally a question
the jury, or the trier of the facts; but, as in many other
cases, the time being so long, and the delay in offering to res-
cind may be so entirely without excuse or fair explanation,
that the courts will as a matter of law declare the same un-
reasonable." '13
As an element of damage which the vendee is allowed to
recover upon rescission for breach of warranty is included
the reasonable expense which he incurs in caring for, reselling
or otherwise managing the property for the vendor after the
contract is rescinded.'4
Before concluding, our attention is directed to the fact
that our lourts, in opposition to those of several other states,
favor the vendee with every reasonable opportunity to make
himself whole, and show a tendency to enlarge rather than
restrict his remedies. In Crouch v. Morgan,"' several parties
purchased a stallion, with an express warranty, each giving
12. 55 Mo. App. 617.
13. Johnson v. Whitman, 20 Mo. App. 100; Pierce v. Siegel, 60 Mo.
App. 148.
14. Walls v. Gates, 4 Mo. App. 1; Phares v. Jaynes, 118 Mo. App.
546.
15. 135 Mo. App. 611.
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his note to the seller for his respective share in the horse. The
animal failed to come up to the warranty and one of the
purchasers offered to relinquish his interest in the horse to
the seller, although the others did not. In a suit on the note
it was held that this constituted a defense to the action, and
that it was not necessary to prove that the horse was
actually worthless.
Another case demonstrating this fact is Morrison, McIn-
tosh & Co. v. Leiser,21 in which it is declared that where a
vendee purchases a certain quality of goods to be delivered
in two installments, he will be allowed to revoke the order for
the last installment when the goods delivered in the first in-
stallment are inferior in quality.1"
In the case of Gallais v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co., the
defendant constructed a floor for the plaintiff which it war-
ranted should be waterproof for a period of five years. The
plaintiff sued for a breach of warranty, and as is said at page
345:
"Defendant offered to prove that it offered to repair the
floor and make it waterproof but plaintiff refused to permit
the repairs to be made. The court rejected the evidence. This
ruling is assigned as error. Defendant's guarantee was not
that it would construct a waterproof floor and keep the same
waterproof by repairs, as needed, for five years, but that it
would construct a waterproof floor and guarantee it to remain
waterproof for five years. Repairs were not provided for in
the contract, hence defendant had no right to make them with-
out plaintiff's consent, and its offer to make them did not re-
lieve it of its liability for a breach of warranty."
In the Eversole case the defendant agreed to supply the
plaintiff with pure milk for a given period of time. The
former became delinquent by supplying impure milk wh~ich
16. 73 Mo. App. 96.
17. Exceptional cases evidencing the liberal tendency of courts in this
direction: Gallais v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co. 127 Mo. App. 338 and
Evermole & Eversole Y. Hanna, 184 Mo. App. 445.
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the latter continued to receive and sell to its customers. In
the suit for the breach, the court held that in A continuing
contract no waiver of quality is implied from the retention
of inferior goods and that the plaintiffs did not waive the
breach by continuing to accept the impure milk.
This note sets forth the law in reference to the buyer's
remedies for breach of warranty as it is applied in the State
of Missouri, and we comprehend with much gratification that
our courts have-in general discarded the old hairline distinc-
tions mentioned in the introduction, have departed from the
law of England (which does not permit a rescission for breach
of warranty), and have adopted the doctrine in force in Mass-
achusetts and other of the more progressive American states,
which permits both a rescission and the survival of the war-
ranty after acceptance of the goods, and which Judge Hawley
declared in English vs. Spokane Commission Co.,1 to be
"The great weight of authority, as well as reason."
G. A. Bu rim, Jn., '22.
18. 57 Pod. 4656.
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